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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SELF-INCRIMINATION-
FEDERAL STANDARD REQUIRED OF THE
STATES BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
In June of 1964, the Supreme Court of the United States held
that the privilege against self-incrimination found in the Bill
of Rights is a fundamental right which each state must guaran-
tee to its citizens. Speaking through Justice Brennan, the Court
said that the petitioner who had been imprisoned for refusing
to answer questions in a state gambling investigation had been
denied the due process of law required by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The case involved a Connecticut citizen who had refused to
answer any questions concerning the circumstances surrounding
his arrest and conviction in 1959 for pool-selling. The Connecti-
cut Supreme Court of Errors held that the privilege could not
be properly invoked, since the petitioner was immune to prose-
cution for the activities in which he had been engaged due to
the running of the one year statute of limitations, and also be-
cause he had failed to show how the revelation of his relation-
ship with another would incriminate him. In reversing, the
Supreme Court held that, henceforth, the courts must apply the
federal standard when the privilege is invoked, and that,
measured by that standard, the petitioner had been denied due
process. The state was attempting to find out who ran the
gambling operations in question, and, had the petitioner answered,
he might have provided a necessary link in a chain which could
have connected him to a crime for which he could still be
convicted (e.g., conspiracy) or it may have acted as a waiver
with respect to his relationship with a possible criminal. Malloy
v. Hogan, 84 Sup. Ct. 489 (1964).t
In extending the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to include a procedural right which some feel is not
and never has been fundamental, the Court has taken a signi-
ficant step toward what must ultimately be the total inclusion
of every right of citizenship in that Amendment-unrestrained
even by the limits of the Bill of Rights. The decision does not
represent a new departure, but rather another stone in the wall
of protection which the Court has been erecting around what it
1. In separate dissenting opinions, Justices Harlan and Clark, and Justices
White and Stewart registered their disapproval with the decision.
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deems to be the fundamental rights of the individual. The de-
cision is in keeping with the theory under which the Court has
operated for the past half-century.
In order to place this step in its proper perspective, it is
necessary to review briefly the development of this area of con-
stitutional law. Prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment in the aftermath of the Civil War, the Bill of Rights
-and the separate rights therein-had no application to the
states. The first eight amendments were drawn up by the
Founding Fathers as limitations on the central government.
They apparently felt it unnecessary and politically inexpedient
to place similar restrictions on the states. In fact, an amendment
proposed by Madison to deny to the states the power to violate
"the equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or
the trial by jury in criminal cases"2 was defeated in the First
Congress. The clear intent of the drafters was affirmed in 1833,
in Barron v. Baltimore,3 when the Court, speaking through John
Marshall, held that the provision in the Fifth Amendment pro-
scribing the taking of private property for public use without
just compensation was intended "solely as a limitation on the
exercise of power by the government of the United States and
... not applicable to the legislation of the states."4 The Bill of
Rights, the Chief Justice said, was ratified as "security against
the apprehended encroachments of the general government-not
against those of the local government."' 5
By thetime of the Civil War this proposition was generally
accepted, but the war's end brought the ratification of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and the whole issue was reopened. Since the
intent of the Congress which framed the Reconstruction Amend-
ment was not so clear as that expressed by the drafters of the
Bill of Rights, the battle has raged for a century as to just what
was intended. In an appendix to his dissenting opinion in
Adamson v. California,6 Justice Black set out in detail the pro
side of the argument. He felt that the framers meant to and did
2. Quoted in Warren, The New 'Liberty' Under the Fourteenth Amendment,
39 HARV. L. REv. 431, 434 (1926). In the ensuing debate Thomas Tucker of
South Carolina answered the proponents of the amendment that it would "be
much better . . . to leave the State Governments to themselves and not to
interfer with them more than we already do . I." 1bid.
3. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
4. Id. at 250-51.
5. Id. at 250.
6. 332 U.S. 46, 92 (1947). For a refutation of justice Black's view, see
Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?
The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949).
1961]
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include the Bill or Rights in the Due Process Clause of the
Amendment. Justices Murphy and Rutledge, while agreeing that
the Due Process Clause included the entire Bill of Rights, felt
that it went further, in that it was not "entirely and necessarily
limited by the Bill of Rights."
7
Although the Court has never accepted this view that the
Bill of Rights applies to the states in its entirety, it lost little
time in applying a gloss to the Due Process Clause of the Amend-
ment8 which could, and undoubtedly will, do the job that both
the drafters and Justice Black failed to do-apply the entire
Bill of Rights, or all of it which is relevant to our times, to the
states.
In Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago,'0 the Court held that
the action of a state in taking private property for public use
without just compensation was "wanting in the due process of
law required by the 14th Amendment of the Constitution...."11
Shortly after the turn of the century, while holding that a state
need not guarantee the freedom from self-incrimination, the
Court stated that:
It is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded
by the first eight amendments against national action may
also be safeguarded against state action, because a denial
of them would be a denial of due process of law ... If this
is so, it is not because the rights are enumerated in the first
eight amendments, but because they are of such a nature
that they are included in the conception of due process of
law.1
2
In Holden v. Hardy,13 a decade earlier, in speaking of due pro-
cess the Court said that it was sufficient to say "that there are
certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very
7. Adamson v. California, supra note 6, at 124.
8. It became apparent quite early that the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment would hold little protection for the individual
against state legislation or action. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900);
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). "Only a few scattered
rights of a national character . . . are considered embodied in the . . . clause;
it has become in effect a last resort for hopeless constitutional claims."
58 YALE L. J. 268, 269 n 9 (1949).
9. It is doubtful that the Court would include the provision of the Seventh
Amendment requiring a jury trial in suits where the value in controversy
exceeds twenty dollars.
10. 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
11. Id. at 241.
12. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908).
13. 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
[Vol. 16
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idea of a free government which no member of the Union may
disregard. .. .,14
Justice Cardozo, in Palko v. Connecticut,"' expressed the
theory under which the Court apparently operates. Certain
rights, he said, are valid against the states, as well as the Federal
Government, because they are "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty."16 If a right is found to be "implicit" in this concept,
no state may violate it; if not, the decision is up to the state.
Cardozo felt that, although the line which separates these rights
may seem to be a wavering and broken one, meaning can be
found in the fact that the rights which the Court has found
"implicit" are rights which are basic to our freedom. The fact
that certain of the rights found in the earlier amendments have
been taken into the Fourteenth by a "process of absorption", he
said, indicated a belief on the part of the Court that these
rights are fundamental, and that without them neither liberty
nor justice could survive. 17
In 1920, the Court assumed for the sake of argument that the
freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment was a
natural and inherent right which no state could violate.' 8 Five
years later, in Gitlow v. New York,19 the Court said that "for
present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech
and of the press-which are protected by the 1st Amendment
from abridgement by Congress-are among the fundamental
rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the
14th Amendment from impairment by the states."-20
14. Id. at 389.
15. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
16. Id. at 325.
17. This dictum of Cardozo's dealing with "absorption" of rights has been
criticized by those who feel he is saying that the rights enforced against the
states are the full federal rights. Louis Henkin, in an excellent article on"selective incorporation", states that Palko is not only not authority for such
a theory, but that his language actually negates such a theory. Cardozo, he says,
held that the state's appeal of error did not put the defendant in double jeopardy,
but he reserved judgment on the question of whether or not a state might
appeal on error-free trial. Thus he was implying some right might exist in
due process, but not the full federal right. Henkin, "Selective Incorporation"
in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L. J. 74, 80-81 (1963). But see
Malloy v. Hogan, 84 Sup. Ct. 1489, at 1495 (1964) : "The Court has thus re-
jected the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the states only a
'watered-down, subjective version of the Bill of Rights.'"
18. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920). But see Prudential Ins. Co.
v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543 (1922).
19. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
20. Id. at 666.
1961:]
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In short order, the Court included the other rights found in
the First Amendment: religion,21 press,22 assembly and peti-
tion, 2 3 and association.24 The right to counsel in capital cases,
2 5
and later in non-capital cases involving serious crimes,26 was
added, as was the right to be safe in one's home from unlawful
searches and seizures. 27 The provision of the Eighth Amend-
ment relating to cruel and unusual punishments was included
in Robinson v. California,28 and, in a series of cases, the Court
has reversed convictions in state courts based on confessions
where there has been any hint of coercion. 29
At the same time, however, the Court has refused to enforce
under the Due Process Clause the rights on the other side of
Cardozo's "wavering line". The rights, while important, are
not "of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty. [There-
fore] to abolish them is not to violate a 'principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental.' ,,0 Among these are the right to a
trial by jury,81 a grand jury indictment 32 and, until Malloy v.
lbogan,83 the privilege against self-incrimination .
4
In the reasoning of the Court in Malloy was that the decisions
in the area of state use of coerced confessions had so eroded the
doctrine of Adamson and Twining v. New Jersey3 5 that it could
no longer be considered good authority for the proposition that
21. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Hamilton v. Regents of
the Univ. of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
22. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
23. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
24. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
25. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
26. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
27. In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the Court said, at page 27,
that "the security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-
which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. It
is ... implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and .. . enforceable against
the states ... ." The Court, however, refused to exclude the evidence illegally
obtained. But in 1961, in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court
reversed Wolf in so far as it refused to exclude the evidence obtained by the
illegal search, and held that the right of privacy guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment ". . . is enforceable against the states by the same sanction of
exclusion as is used against the Federal Government." Id. at 655.
28. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
29. See text accompanying footnotes 36-43.
30. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
31. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
32. Ibid.; Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
33. 84 Sup. Ct. 1489 (1964).
34. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78 (1908).
35. Supra note 34.
[Vol. 16
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the right to refuse to be a witness against oneself is not a
"fundamental" right.
In passing on a confession that had been forced, in a case not
involving a state, the Supreme Court has said that, when the
question arises as to whether a confession is incompetent because
not voluntary, the "issue is controlled by that portion of the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution... commanding that no
person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.' ,,36 The Court has refused to allow the use in
state courts of any confession that is not free and voluntary.
Approaching on a case by case basis-a method which apparently
leaves little in the way of guidelines-the Court has reversed
convictions based on confessions which were forced by torture,"7
given "voluntarily" after an excessive period of questioning, 8
or even where the sympathy of the defendant has been played
upon as an inducement.3 9
In Watts v. Indiana,40 the Court spoke of the accused's "re-
fusal of disclosure which is his constitutional right."141 Clearly
this right of non-disclosure is analogous to the privilege against
self-incrimination. Although the authority for and the back-
ground of each is different, the policies behind the two are simi-
lar. Again, in Gallegos v. Colorado,4 2 the Court expressed the
view that one of the main reasons that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment condemns confessions obtained
through coercion is the "element of compulsion which is con-
demned by the Fifth Amendment.1
43
It is indeed difficult to see how the Court could square the
decisions in the area of coerced confessions with the notion that
the states can compel a person to incriminate himself, and agree
with Twining,44 or with Cardozo's dictum in Snyder v. Massa-
chusetts4 5 that "the privilege against self-incrimination may be
withdrawn and the accused put upon the stand as a witness for
36. Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897).
37. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278 (1936).
38. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
39. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). See Haynes v. Washington,
373 U.S. 503 (1963), where a conviction based on a confession was overturned
because the accused was not allowed to call his wife or attorney until he signed.
40. 338 U.S. 49 (1949).
41. Id. at 54.
42. 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
43. Id. at 51.
44. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
45. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
1961:]
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the state,"40 or with Palko: "the immunity from compulsory
self-incrimination . . . . too might be lost, and justice still be
done.,
47
It is clear that the relationship between the two rights is
there, and, just as clearly, the right is fundamental. What is
actually involved here is a right to silence. Such a right is not,
and cannot be, unlimited, but it does extend to the point of
protecting an individual from being forced to be a witness
against himself. As the respondent State of Connecticut con-
ceded in Malloy, it is "fundamentally inconsistent to suggest, as
the Court's opinions now suggest, that the State is entirely free
to compel an accused to incriminate himself before a grand
jury, or at the trial, but cannot do so in the police station.
'48
The privilege is more than merely a protection against a pro-
secution and conviction based solely on evidence forced from the
accused; it is a "safeguard of conscience and human dignity
.... ,,40 Dean Griswold has said that the privilege is "one of
the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civil-
ized."1 0 This right is probably one of our least appreciated, but,
as it has been said so often, without the power which this right
restricts, the inquisition can never function in this country. To-
day, when an individual can be forced to reveal his very thoughts
through the use of narcotics, hypnotism, lie detectors and other
means, the courts must be especially vigilant to see that the
fundamental right of a man to refuse to be the instrument of
his own destruction is protected.
In approaching a decision such as the one in Malloy, the Court
is, in actuality, balancing the interests of society against the
rights of the citizen. The legitimate interests of the state in the
administration of its criminal justice cannot be questioned, nor
can the fact that this interest is limited by the demands of the
Fourteenth Amendment be questioned. It is, therefore, the place
of the Supreme Court to see that in the quest of society for
law and order the fundamental rights of the individual are not
infringed.
The Fourteenth Amendment necessarily gave the Court broad
discretion in determining what limitations should be placed upon
46. Id. at 105.
47. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
48. Brief for Respondent, quoted in Malloy v. Hogan, 84 Sup. Ct. 1489, 1494-
95 (1964).
49. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 445 (1956).
50. Gimswou,, THE FIrtH AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955).
[Vol. 16
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the states. Perhaps it is unfortunate that the Justices cannot
proceed within clearly marked boundaries in interpreting the
clause, but must instead, "roam at will in the limitless area of
their own beliefs. ... 51 However, that was not the intention
of those who drafted the amendment, nor would it be altogether
satisfactory if it had been. Certainly the view of Palko, which
applies some of the rights in the Bill of Rights to the states, is
preferable to and sounder than the earlier views, such as Twining,
which would apply none of them. It is also much to be pre-
ferred to the total incorporation view, which would tie the
Court to an Eighteenth Century evaluation of what rights are
and what rights are not fundamental. In the flexibility of the
approach of the Court lies its true value. Although there is al-
ways the possibility that some future Court might "selectively"
remove from the Due Process Clause the rights that have been
found there over the past half-century; this is a gamble that a
system based on a living constitution, such as ours, must take.
Shortly after the Court reaffirmed in Adamson v. California
52
that the privilege against self-incrimination need not be guar-
anteed by a state, a writer stated that a main issue raised by the
case was "whether the due process technique so abjectly fails to
protect personal liberties that-practically by default-Justice
Black's technique must be adopted." 53 The development of the
Court's approach up to and including Malloy indicates that such
fears were groundless.
WILLIAM B. REGAN
51. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 92 (1947).
52. Supra note 51.
53. 58 YALE L. 3. 268, 278 (1949).
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